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Философия и культура
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Прись И.Е.
О проблеме объяснительного провала в философии сознания
// Философия и культура.
2015. № 3.
С. 421-429.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2015.3.10930 URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=10930
О проблеме объяснительного провала в философии сознания
Прись Игорь Евгеньевич
кандидат философских наук, кандидат физико-математических наук
старший научный сотрудник, Институт философии
220012, Беларусь, г. Минск, ул. Сурганова, 1, оф. 810
Pris Francois-Igor
Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy
220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810
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frigpr@gmail.com
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Другие публикации этого автора
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DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2015.3.10930
Дата направления статьи в редакцию:
15-04-2015
Дата публикации:
06-05-2015
Аннотация:
Статья представляет собой введение в проблему объяснительного провала в философии сознания. Даётся обзор основных подходов к решению этой проблемы. Внимание акцентируется с одной стороны на попытках преодоления чисто физикалистских подходов, а с другой на критике дуализма. Блок, например, вводит понятие имплицитно физических феноменальных концептов. Папино признаёт, что феноменальные концепты имеют особую природу. Левин возвращается к понятию экуэйнтанс. Варела предлагает расширить традиционную науку и развивает нейро-феноменологию. Исследование проводится методом сравнения основных подходов к решению проблемы объяснительного провала. Предпочтение отдаётся феноменальному реализму. Устанавливается что традиционный материализм/физикализм сталкивается с принципиальными трудностями в решении проблемы объяснительного провала. В то же время дуализм свойств является неприемлемой позицией, противостоять которой, по всей видимости, может лишь неметафизическая версия натуралистического феноменального реализма, или нетрадиционный контекстуалистский натурализм/физикализм виттгенштайновского типа.
Ключевые слова:
проблема объяснительного провала, трудная проблема, психо-физические тождества, физико-физические тождества, феноменальные концепты, концептулаьный дуализм, феноменальный реализм, физикализм, дуализм свойств, нейро-феноменология
Abstract: The paper introduces the explanatory gap problem in the philosophy of mind. A review of the mainapproaches to the problem shows that the traditional materialism/physicalism encounters the principaldifficulties. The article introduces the explanatory gap problem gap in the philosophy of mind. The author provides a brief review of the main approaches to the problem. The author focuses on attempts to overcome physical approaches, on the one hand, and critics of dualism, on the other hand. For example, Blok offered the definition of implicit physical phenomenal concepts. Papineau admitted that phenomenal concepts had a singular nature. Levin spoke of the concept of acquaintance. Varela offered to extend the scope of the traditional science and developed so called neuro-phenomenology. The research is based on the method of comparison of the main approaches to solving the explanatory gap problem. Preference is given to phenomenal realism. The author demonstrates that the traditional materialism/physicalism encounters the principal difficulties when solving the explanatory gap problem. At the same time, property dualism is an essential concept only a non-metaphysical version of naturalistic phenomenal realism, or nontraditional contextual naturalism/physicalism of Wittgenstein type may compete with.
Keywords: explanatory gap problem, hard problem, psycho-physical identities, physico-physical identities, phenomenal concepts, conceptual dualism, phenomenal realism, physicalism, property dualism, neuro-phenomenology
Библиография
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2. Benoist J. Concepts. Paris : Les éditions CERF, 2010/2011.
3. Benoist J. Eléments de philosophie réaliste. Paris: Vrin, 2011.
4. Benoist J. Making Ontology Sensitive // Cont. Philos. Rev. (Published online. 04 August 2012) 2012.
5. Benoist J. Le bruit du sensible. Collection « Passages ». Paris: Les éditions CERF, 2013.
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8. Block N. The Harder Problem of Consciousness // Journal of Philosophy. 2002. 99. N 8. C. 391-425.
9. Block N. Max Black's objection to mind-body identity // Oxford Review of Metaphysics. 2006. 2. C. 3-78.
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11. Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
12. Chalmers D.J. & Jackson, F. Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation // Philosophical Review. 2001. 110. C. 315-61.
13. Chalmers D.J. Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument // In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. MIT Press, 2004.
14. Chalmers D. J. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap // In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press, 2006.
15. Churchland P. M. & Churchland P. S. Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality // Philosophical Topics, 1981. 12: 121-132
16. Dennett D. Quining Qualia // In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (pp. 381-414). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
17. Dennett D. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
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19. Jackson F. What Mary Didn’t Know? // Journal of Philosophy. 1986. Том. 83. С. 291-295.
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22. Levine J. On leaving out what it's like. // In Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. 1993.
23. Levine J. Conceivability and the metaphysics of mind // Nous. 1998. 32:4. C. 449-480.
24. Levine J. Knowing what it's like // In Gertler, B. (ed.) Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 2003.
25. Levin J. What is a phenomenal concept? // In T. Alter and S. Walter, eds. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. 2006 a.
26. Levine J. Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint // In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. 2006 b.
27. Lewis D. An Argument for the Identity Theory // Journal of Philosophy. 1966. Том. 63, C. 17-25.
28. Loar B. Phenomenal states // Philosophical Perspectives, 1990. 4. C. 81-108.
29. Loar B. Phenomenal States II // In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The Mit Press. 1997.
30. Loar B. Transparent experience and the availability of qualia // In Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Clarendon. 2003.
31. McGinn C. Can we solve the mind-body problem? // Mind, 1989. 98. C. 349-66.
32. McLaughlin B. P. A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem // Philosophical Issues, 2003. 13. C. 163-204.
33. Nagel T. What is it like to be a bat? // Philosophical Review, 1974. 4. С. 435-50.
34. Nagel T. The psychophysical nexus // New Essays on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, eds. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000.
35. Papineau D. Philosophical Naturalism. Basil Blackwell, 1993.
36. Papineau D. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2002.
37. Papineau D. Phenomenal and perceptual concepts // In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 2006.
38. Papineau D. Phenomenal Concepts are not Demonstrative // In MM McCabe and M Textor (eds) Perspectives on Perception. 2007.
39. Papineau D. What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? // Philosophia. 2011. 39 (1). C. 5-19.
40. Peacocke C. Phenomenology and nonconceptual content // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2001. 62. C. 609-615.
41. Perry J. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press, 2001.
42. Searle J. R. The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press, 1992.
43. Searle J. R. The problem of consciousness // In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley, 1993.
44. Searle J.R. Why I am not a property dualist // Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2002. 9, n. 12. C. 57-64.
45. Stalnaker R. Доклад, сделанный в IJN в Париже в июне 2006.
46. Varela F. Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem // Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1995. 3. C. 330-49.
47. White S. Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise // In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 2006.
References
1. Benoist J. Sens et sensibilité. L’intentionalité en contexte. Paris: LeCerf, 2009.
2. Benoist J. Concepts. Paris : Les éditions CERF, 2010/2011.
3. Benoist J. Eléments de philosophie réaliste. Paris: Vrin, 2011.
4. Benoist J. Making Ontology Sensitive // Cont. Philos. Rev. (Published online. 04 August 2012) 2012.
5. Benoist J. Le bruit du sensible. Collection « Passages ». Paris: Les éditions CERF, 2013.
6. Bitbol M. Physique et philosophie de l’esprit. Paris : Flammarion, 2000.
7. Block N. & Stalnaker R. Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap // Philosophical Review. 1999. 108. C. 1-46.
8. Block N. The Harder Problem of Consciousness // Journal of Philosophy. 2002. 99. N 8. C. 391-425.
9. Block N. Max Black's objection to mind-body identity // Oxford Review of Metaphysics. 2006. 2. C. 3-78.
10. Carruthers P. Reductive explanation and the ‘explanatory gap’ // Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2004. 34 (2). C. 153-173.
11. Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
12. Chalmers D.J. & Jackson, F. Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation // Philosophical Review. 2001. 110. C. 315-61.
13. Chalmers D.J. Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument // In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. MIT Press, 2004.
14. Chalmers D. J. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap // In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press, 2006.
15. Churchland P. M. & Churchland P. S. Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality // Philosophical Topics, 1981. 12: 121-132
16. Dennett D. Quining Qualia // In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (pp. 381-414). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
17. Dennett D. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
18. Hohwy J. Evidence, explanation and experience. On the harder problem of consciousness // Journal of Philosophy 2004. 101 (5). C. 242-254.
19. Jackson F. What Mary Didn’t Know? // Journal of Philosophy. 1986. Tom. 83. S. 291-295.
20. Kripke S. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
21. Levine J. Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. // Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 1983. 64. C. 354-61.
22. Levine J. On leaving out what it's like. // In Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. 1993.
23. Levine J. Conceivability and the metaphysics of mind // Nous. 1998. 32:4. C. 449-480.
24. Levine J. Knowing what it's like // In Gertler, B. (ed.) Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 2003.
25. Levin J. What is a phenomenal concept? // In T. Alter and S. Walter, eds. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. 2006 a.
26. Levine J. Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint // In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. 2006 b.
27. Lewis D. An Argument for the Identity Theory // Journal of Philosophy. 1966. Tom. 63, C. 17-25.
28. Loar B. Phenomenal states // Philosophical Perspectives, 1990. 4. C. 81-108.
29. Loar B. Phenomenal States II // In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The Mit Press. 1997.
30. Loar B. Transparent experience and the availability of qualia // In Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Clarendon. 2003.
31. McGinn C. Can we solve the mind-body problem? // Mind, 1989. 98. C. 349-66.
32. McLaughlin B. P. A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem // Philosophical Issues, 2003. 13. C. 163-204.
33. Nagel T. What is it like to be a bat? // Philosophical Review, 1974. 4. S. 435-50.
34. Nagel T. The psychophysical nexus // New Essays on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, eds. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000.
35. Papineau D. Philosophical Naturalism. Basil Blackwell, 1993.
36. Papineau D. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2002.
37. Papineau D. Phenomenal and perceptual concepts // In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 2006.
38. Papineau D. Phenomenal Concepts are not Demonstrative // In MM McCabe and M Textor (eds) Perspectives on Perception. 2007.
39. Papineau D. What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? // Philosophia. 2011. 39 (1). C. 5-19.
40. Peacocke C. Phenomenology and nonconceptual content // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2001. 62. C. 609-615.
41. Perry J. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press, 2001.
42. Searle J. R. The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press, 1992.
43. Searle J. R. The problem of consciousness // In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley, 1993.
44. Searle J.R. Why I am not a property dualist // Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2002. 9, n. 12. C. 57-64.
45. Stalnaker R. Doklad, sdelannyi v IJN v Parizhe v iyune 2006.
46. Varela F. Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem // Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1995. 3. C. 330-49.
47. White S. Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise // In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 2006.
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